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Within the span of one year, two civil rights decisions, 
one religious and one secular, signaled momentous shifts 
in the racial and religious demographics of St. Louis’s 
schools and neighborhoods. In the summer of 1947, St. 
Louis’s newly arrived Cardinal Joseph Ritter announced 
that the city and county’s Catholic high schools would 
desegregate.1 A few months later, in January 1948, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled racially restrictive 
housing covenants illegal in the St. Louis–based Shelley 
v. Kraemer case. For decades, racial covenants had forced 
a growing black population to remain in overcrowded, 
segregated neighborhoods, and as a result of the case, 
blacks gradually moved into previously all-white 
neighborhoods across the city and north county. 
These two decisions, imposed upon St. Louisans by 
authority figures, sparked rapid and intense demographic 
change in schools and neighborhoods. The area most 
affected by housing desegregation was the West End 
neighborhood, a working- and middle-class community 
located on the northwestern border of the city. In the 
decade following these two decisions, the West End 
specifically and St. Louis as a whole rose to be a model 
of progressive race relations that quickly faltered. Buoyed 
by an initially lauded school desegregation process, West 
End activists worked hard to stabilize their neighborhood’s 
interracial composition by publicizing the neighborhood 
as a model of an integrated, desirable, middle-class 
community. 
As the decisions of 1947–1948 signaled clear change 
in the city’s population patterns, a broad range of St. 
Louisans exhibited optimism regarding the future of 
race relations in the city. This confidence was especially 
apparent in the way the city’s press portrayed St. 
Louis’s response to the Brown v. Board public school 
desegregation case. When the Brown decision was 
announced in May 1954, local news articles distanced 
the city from the turmoil the case caused in the South. On 
the day of the court’s announcement, the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch foresaw that the decision “will cause the most 
radical upheaval in the South since reconstruction days,” 
yet a day later, the city’s NAACP branch also correctly 
predicted “that no difficulty will be experienced because 
of integrated education [in St. Louis]. … All people have 
a profound respect for the laws of the land.”2 Even though 
the Brown case deemed Missouri’s school segregation laws 
illegal alongside those of the South, the city reported the 
decision as if residents were northern onlookers. In fact, 
St. Louis’s newspapers usually took a nonchalant tone 
regarding the city’s school desegregation to highlight its 
lack of controversy. The press also declined to give much 
publicity to anti-integration protest, choosing instead to 
focus on the logistics of the desegregation plan. 3 The 
Post-Dispatch, the Globe-Democrat, and the black-owned 
Argus described the three desegregation phases planned by 
the school board, announced each stage of implementation, 
and reported the number black students who transferred 
to each previously all-white school. They provided quotes 
from school administrators who praised students for 
adapting quickly to their new peers.4 Overall, Missouri’s 
desegregation process received surprisingly little attention 
from the press, and St. Louisans prided themselves on their 
peaceful, law-abiding citizenry that seemed, for the most 
part, accepting of progressive change.
Certainly, some ardent and vocal segregationists 
expressed their anger at desegregation. Most notably, 
an organization called the National Citizens Protective 
Association organized briefly to express opposition to 
the desegregation plan. Many others surely expressed 
disapproval of segregation privately, and a minority of 
parents instructed their children not to associate with 
black classmates socially, telling their children to “just 
act like [the black students] are not there.”5 But public 
school desegregation plans in St. Louis were implemented 
without violence or widespread opposition and with the 
support of a variety of community institutions, especially 
civil rights, interfaith, and neighborhood organizations.6 
In some cases, parents organized to ease their children’s 
schools’ integration. They expressed their enthusiasm 
that desegregation strengthened the city’s commitment to 
equality and democracy, and their views were accepted 
as mainstream.7 At the time it was implemented in 1954–
1955, civil rights groups and liberal whites largely hailed 
the integration process as a victory. Indeed, the St. Louis 
Joseph Ritter (1892–1967) had already taken action to 
desegregate Catholic schools before he arrived in St. Louis 
as archbishop in 1947.  As the new Bishop of Indianapolis 
in 1938, Ritter ordered that parochial schools no longer be 
segregated, which met with opposition and protests from 
groups as varied as the Ku Klux Klan and some clergy.  
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)
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Board of Education had completed its desegregation plan 
on schedule by September 1955, just over a year after the 
Brown decision and two years before the federally forced 
desegregation of Central High in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
City leaders, school officials, residents, and news outlets 
touted St. Louis as a law-abiding community willing to 
actively facilitate, or at least passively accept, integration. 
Despite this tranquil picture, the recently desegregated 
schools and racially transitioning neighborhoods in St. 
Louis fell prey to re-segregation within only a few years, 
and this racial and economic segregation has persisted to 
the present day. There were instances in the late fifties and 
early sixties of the school board allowing white students to 
attend white schools outside of their neighborhood districts 
through loopholes and busing, but overall re-segregation 
occurred due to racial change within city and county 
neighborhoods. Less than ten years after this purported 
triumph of school integration and racial progressivism, 
school and neighborhood desegregation had all but 
disappeared, and St. Louis became yet another example of 
the devastating shortcomings of liberal racial policies.
Why did a city that acted so confidently to end legalized 
school segregation overwhelmingly fail to sustain 
integrated urban schools and neighborhoods? The answer 
lies in the contradictions of liberalism, both in St. Louis 
and throughout the country. Historian Robert Self defines 
liberalism with four factors: a general commitment to 
New Deal welfare institutions, the economic promotion 
of the middle class, equality of opportunity for all races, 
and individualism.8 As Self has explained, a central pitfall 
of liberalism in the mid-twentieth century was that when 
white liberals’ commitment to racial equality clashed 
with their commitment to expanded opportunity for the 
middle class, they almost always favored benefiting the 
middle class to the detriment of black economic, political, 
and housing opportunities. White liberals’ desire to live 
and own property in upwardly mobile communities 
ultimately trumped visions of interracial neighborhoods. 
Self provides a crucial explanation for where goals 
of liberalism fall apart, but it is necessary to analyze 
local cases to understand why this breakdown of liberal 
ideology occurred and what its consequences were.
Two distinct but related types of liberalism were present 
in St. Louis, though both failed to create a coherent vision 
of an urban community that was both integrated and 
economically prosperous. A small but vocal cohort of 
active liberals understood that maintaining an integrated 
urban neighborhood would require individuals to make 
housing choices based on a desire to foster an integrated 
community. They understood that pursuing economic 
advancement and racial integration simultaneously would 
require a personal commitment. They joined interracial 
neighborhood organizations with the goal of fostering an 
integrated, economically stable neighborhood. As large 
numbers of their neighbors disinvested in the city and 
moved to the suburbs, however, active liberals realized that 
their agenda would be incredibly difficult to implement. 
Organizations that promoted neighborhood advancement 
experienced interracial disagreements, inhibiting their 
moral authority. Further, active white liberals never had a 
critical mass to influence demographic patterns. Despite a 
more realistic understanding of what it would take to craft 
an integrated neighborhood, active liberals were unable to 
sustain an interracial community. 
In addition to a small number of active liberals, the 
majority of whites in the West End were what can be 
called passive liberals: they believed in both economic 
opportunity and racial equality, but were unwilling to take 
any actions that would risk their financial security. To be a 
passive liberal does not mean that these individuals were 
unwilling to act; in fact, these individuals were quick to 
leave the neighborhood when they sensed the possibility 
of economic decline. These individuals assumed that an 
influx of black residents would decrease property values, 
and they chose to leave the West End (sometimes even 
before blacks started moving into the neighborhood) rather 
than risk living in a declining community. Passive liberals 
could feel secure that their race-based decisions were not 
racist because they espoused the rhetoric of racial equality. 
The term “passive” therefore refers to the nature of their 
commitment to liberalism: they believed that individuals 
should not be responsible for personally participating in 
residential desegregation. Passive liberalism could only 
improve race relations when a community would endorse 
policies that were becoming mainstream, as was the 
case in St. Louis’s public school desegregation.9 Passive 
liberalism failed to produce improvements for blacks when 
whites perceived personal financial or social risks, seen 
in whites’ housing choices in the late 1940s through the 
1950s. While this passive liberalism may seem innocuous 
on its surface, it had pernicious consequences that have 
maintained economic and racial segregation into the 
twenty-first century. Most insidious, as passive liberalism 
became the mainstream in the West End, individuals 
could espouse liberal rhetoric while justifying race-based 
decisions about where to live and with whom to socialize.
To better understand racially transitioning 
neighborhoods, urban scholars have examined the religious 
influences within cities, which in many cases had profound 
effects on urban policy and neighborhood demographics. 
Attention to religious population patterns is especially 
important in heavily Catholic St Louis and in the West 
End, which had a large Jewish population. Even though 
the character of liberalism was different for Catholics 
and Jews, the effects of liberalism were similar on each 
group’s housing choices. As evidenced by Cardinal 
Ritter’s decision to desegregate parochial schools, Catholic 
leadership in St. Louis proved much more actively liberal 
than the general population. Parishioners therefore often 
felt caught between their religious devotion to the Catholic 
hierarchy and their social anxiety about living in close 
proximity to blacks. This tension between mandates from 
Catholic religious leaders and discomfort with integrated 
communities translated into a grudging acceptance of 
passive liberalism. It led to the existence of integrated 
institutions and a simultaneous exodus into racially 
homogenous suburbs.10 Even though Jewish laypeople 
were more likely than Catholics to espouse liberal rhetoric, 
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most Jews’ commitments to racial equality and integration 
were also passive—they were ultimately unwilling to take 
any action that posed economic or social risk in order to 
cultivate a desirable, integrated urban neighborhood.11 
For Jews in the West End, the problem with liberalism 
was a gap between rhetoric and action. Passive liberals 
accepted desegregated institutions but proved unwilling 
to commit to active pursuance of an integrated, desirable 
neighborhood.
St. Louisans’ understanding of the necessity and 
inevitability of school integration opened unique 
opportunities for residents to lead integration, and many 
of these efforts had religious influences. Despite efforts 
by some religious and secular leaders, though, St. Louis 
missed its opportunity for a truly integrated city because a 
majority of passively liberal residents and religious leaders 
could not reconcile their theoretical commitment to racial 
equality with personal choices regarding where to live and 
educate their children. Highlighting Catholic and Jewish 
experiences with school and neighborhood desegregation 
demonstrates these complex dynamics. Regardless of 
who spearheaded campaigns to promote integration—
The YMHA/YWHA sponsored a Liberal Forum in the 1940s and 1950s that featured a number of speakers who were 
prominent nationally.  Among those was Max Lerner (1902–1992), a Russian immigrant who became a popular journalist, 
editor, and scholar.  By the time he spoke at the Liberal Forum in St. Louis, he was well known for advocating rights for 
African-Americans, as well as supporting internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. (Image: St. Louis Jewish 
Community Archives)
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institutionally based Catholic leaders, individual liberal 
Jewish leaders, or secular interracial neighborhood 
organizations—the results were similar: between 1945 and 
1960, most whites moved out of neighborhoods that began 
integrating after 1948. 
St. Louis’s West End neighborhood typifies the city’s 
racial transition and failed efforts to create stable, middle-
class, integrated urban spaces. The West End is located 
north of Forest Park, extending west to the city limits, 
east to Kingshighway Boulevard, one of the city’s central 
arteries, and north approximately to Natural Bridge Road. 
The West End bordered African American residential 
enclaves, making it a logical place for blacks to move 
after the Shelley v. Kraemer decision. The neighborhood’s 
Windemere Place was the first block of the city to 
desegregate in the wake of the court decision.12 Individuals 
who lived in the West End in the first half of the twentieth 
century remember it fondly. Harvey Brown, a Jewish 
West End resident from 1937–1950, explained, “it was a 
wonderful place to grow up, and we had everything we 
needed. . . . [W]e had so many places to go to play.”13 
The West End was home to two Catholic parishes that 
flourished during the early twentieth century: St. Rose of 
Lima and St. Mark. Adjacent to the neighborhood lies the 
Cathedral Basilica of St. Louis, the spiritual center of the 
archdiocese of St. Louis. A variety of Jewish congregations 
also inhabited the neighborhood through the first half 
of the century. Most of these synagogues had relocated 
to the West End from locations in or near downtown, 
following a population shift as the Jewish community 
grew, prospered economically, and moved west. Even 
though racial transition was occurring by the early fifties, 
the West End still boasted at least fourteen separate Jewish 
congregations in 1954.14 While many Catholic children 
attended parochial schools, most Jews sent their children 
to public school. Soldan High School (for a brief period 
known as Soldan-Blewett), located on Union Boulevard in 
the heart of the West End, housed a large Jewish student 
body from its construction in 1909 until after World 
War II and was a source of pride for the neighborhood. 
In fact, Jewish alumnae and their families continue to 
refer to the school and the prominent place it once had 
for their community. Analyzing Catholic, Jewish, and 
secular responses to school and neighborhood integration 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of St. Louis’s liberalism.  
There is a very strong Catholic influence on the St. 
Louis region. St. Louis today has a higher proportion of 
Catholics attending parochial schools than any diocese 
in the country.15 As Cardinal Joseph Ritter’s 1947 school 
desegregation indicated, the liberal Catholic impulse 
to embrace integrated schools and neighborhoods was 
rooted in Catholic leadership and institutions. While some 
Catholic St. Louisians supported school and neighborhood 
integration, a large portion resented incoming blacks. 
Clergy, recognizing that fixed parish boundaries would 
suffer great population losses if white Catholics abandoned 
their parishes, worked to convince white Catholics to 
remain in their parishes and also sometimes to convert 
Temple Israel was among the religious institutions at the “Holy Corners” area in the Central West End at the intersection of 
Kingshighway and McPherson, and it was the synagogue for the large Jewish population in the West End.  (Image: St. Louis 
Jewish Community Archives)
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blacks to Catholicism. These efforts, both to keep white 
Catholics in the city and to convert blacks, were largely 
unsuccessful. The post–World War II years witnessed a 
substantial decline of the Catholic population in St. Louis 
city, and many urban parishes—including those in and 
near the West End—had to be closed or consolidated in 
the late twentieth century due to a decreasing Catholic 
population.
By the early twentieth century, the vast majority of 
the Catholic population in St. Louis was white. Black 
Catholics, whose population had French Creole roots, 
worshiped in the segregated St. Elizabeth Parish, and 
many sent their children to St. Joseph’s Colored High 
School. However, Cardinal Ritter’s 1947 announcement 
that all Catholic high schools would desegregate was 
a reaction to the inadequate resources at St. Joseph’s. 
His actively liberal proclamation provoked a variety of 
responses from both Catholics and non-Catholics, and 
correspondence poured into the Archdiocese from St. 
Louis, across the country, and places as remote as Mexico 
and Bangalore. The vast majority of the letters—402 
out of 479—expressed approval of Cardinal Ritter’s 
actions.16 They applauded his courageous declaration and 
implored him not to let segregationists change his mind. 
One approving citizen wrote, “it is difficult to see how the 
Church’s mission to men of all races and nationalities can 
be fulfilled in the United States without some bold action 
such as your own.”17 
Those who disapproved also sent emotional letters. 
They cited many reasons—personal, economic, political, 
and racial—for disapproving of the Cardinal’s actions. 
They expressed outrage that stemmed from fears of 
miscegenation, worry that black people had bad odor, 
frustration that the money white Catholics donated to the 
Archdiocese was being used to help undeserving blacks, 
and a belief that Cardinal Ritter’s unilateral action was 
reminiscent of Hitler’s totalitarianism. Some stated that 
they refused to send their children to integrated institutions 
and intended to transfer their children to other schools, 
with one individual stating, “all I can say is thank God 
for our Public Schools.”18 Still others referred to the city’s 
southern connections, explaining to the Cardinal that “St. 
Louis has always been a pro-Southern city, and I think we 
have handled the racial problem to our advantage, so why 
should the Catholic Church be the first to initiate such a 
drastic flaw?”19 One woman even claimed she no longer 
St. Mark’s Church quickly became a large and prominent Catholic congregation by the start of 
the twentieth century.  This building at Page and Academy avenues, designed by the prominent 
architectural firm of Barnett, Haynes, and Barnett, was completed in 1902.  The school was nearby. 
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)
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wanted to be Catholic.20 The reasoning in the disapproving 
letters ranged from desires to maintain the status quo to 
overt racial hatred. 
It is impossible to tell whether the majority of St. Louis’s 
Catholic population approved or disapproved of Catholic 
school integration solely by analyzing letters sent to 
Cardinal Ritter. Comparing the number of supportive and 
opposing letters sent does little good because many people 
who personally disapproved of the Cardinal’s actions 
were probably unwilling to voice their dissenting opinions 
directly to the Cardinal. What is clear, though, is that 
many Catholics in St. Louis were deeply disconcerted by 
the contradictions between their personal racial views and 
their Cardinal’s liberalism. Other pieces of evidence from 
the months and years after Cardinal Ritter’s announcement 
provide clues to how the community adjusted to integrated 
Catholic schools, as well as to increasing numbers of 
blacks in previously all-white neighborhoods. For the 
most part Catholic St. Louisans, like the majority of the 
city, acted as passive liberals who accepted the reality 
of desegregated institutions due to Cardinal Ritter’s 
liberal activism, but were also unwilling to risk the 
respectability of their city to fight for segregated schools 
and neighborhoods. 
Even if a significant number of Catholics disliked 
Cardinal Ritter’s racial policies, most limited their 
complaints to friends and family. Dan Kelley, a West 
End resident who was ten years old at the time of the 
integration, explained that his parents were very upset with 
the Cardinal’s decision, though they, like most Catholics, 
did not engage in any protest against the decision. Kelley 
recalled, “people talked about it at church” and worried 
that “everything was going to go to hell in a hand basket.” 
In the end, though, he explained that while many disagreed 
with the decision, “they accommodated it.”21 This passive 
acceptance of Catholic school desegregation and the 
Cardinal’s liberal race policies opened an opportunity for 
Catholic leaders to be optimistic about the possibility of 
fostering interracial parishes. However, the ambivalent 
nature of the Catholic community’s commitment to 
integration ultimately did very little to sustain integration 
in the West End.
The most salient example of short-lived but direct 
opposition to Cardinal Ritter’s school integration was a 
Completed in 1909, Soldan High School originally 
educated a wealthy and predominantly Jewish student body 
until the 1950s.  It was named for Frank Louis Soldan, 
superintendent of St. Louis Public Schools who had died the 
previous year.  It is one of several in St. Louis designed by 
William B. Ittner, who designed schools in new ways starting 
in the early twentieth century with increased attention to the 
needs of students and new learning theory.  Today, it is the 
Soldan International Studies High School.
St. Elizabeth’s was an African-American Catholic Church 
in the 1940s; most of its parishioners sent their children to 
the segregated St. Joseph’s Colored High School.  In the 
undated first communion photo from St. Elizabeth’s, note 
the white nun on the left. (Images: Archdiocese of St. Louis 
Archives)
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group of over eight hundred Catholics who formed an 
organization to block Catholic school desegregation. 
The Catholic Parents Association of St. Louis and 
St. Louis County threatened to sue the Cardinal for 
forcing integration. Just weeks after its creation, the 
group reluctantly disbanded after Cardinal Ritter 
announced that anyone opposing the integration would 
be excommunicated. During the emotionally charged 
final meeting of the Catholic Parents Association, group 
leader John Barrett pleaded with the crowd to rescind its 
legal threats against the Cardinal and disband the group. 
On the verge of tears and “in a state of near collapse,” 
he announced, “the only alternative we can now have to 
disbanding this group is to turn on our Archbishop and 
our faith. I am not going to do that. We cannot scandalize 
our Catholic religion and oppose our Archbishop without 
getting into sin. The only way we could carry on after 
this, is to throw up our Catholic religion.”22 Barrett “wept 
openly” as he put forth a motion to disband the group. The 
motion was met with loud booing from the crowd, and 
one man even grabbed the microphone and shouted that 
Catholic parents should transfer their children to public 
schools in protest. Even though the meeting was emotional 
and chaotic, only fifty people voted against disbanding the 
group. After announcing that the motion to disband had 
passed, “Barrett was so overcome that he blindly left the 
platform and, hardly able to walk, [had to be] escorted to 
his car.”23 
Though several individuals voiced their continued 
dissatisfaction with Catholic school integration, the 
Catholic Parents Association was defunct. This event 
indicates two important points. First, when forced 
to choose, St. Louis Catholics who opposed school 
integration chose their religious views over their racial 
views. Second, and equally important, while these 
Catholics ceased fighting school integration, they did 
not have to accept an integrated community. As became 
apparent through housing choices, Catholics often moved 
out of parishes that were integrating. The short-lived 
existence of the Catholic Parents Association, while 
ultimately unsuccessful in their goal of blocking Catholic 
school integration, certainly demonstrated that many 
St. Louis Catholics were unwilling to support Cardinal 
Ritter’s liberal race policies.
While the Catholic Parents Association was the most 
vocal instance of opposition to integrated Catholic schools, 
some parents did indeed remove students from Catholic 
schools that enrolled black students. For example, the all-
girls Rosati-Kain High School, which drew a significant 
number of students from West End parishes, enrolled 
five black students for the 1947–1948 school year.24 As a 
result, “about thirty girls who had previously registered, 
on learning of the acceptance of five colored girls, sought 
entrance to other Catholic High Schools, and a few 
to Public High Schools.”25 In subsequent years, black 
enrollment increased to over one hundred pupils, about 20 
percent of the school population by 1954.26 While some 
parents chose to actively resist integration through school 
choice, the majority kept their children in Catholic schools. 
Even though most St. Louis Catholics were willing to 
tolerate desegregated religious education, the same could 
not be said for integrated neighborhoods. Archdiocese 
concerns and parish population patterns in the racially 
transitioning West End show clearly that the vast majority 
of white Catholics were unwilling to live in integrated 
city neighborhoods; by the late 1960s, St. Rose Parish in 
the West End only served about two hundred Catholics.27 
In a letter to parish priests, Cardinal Ritter specifically 
asked if priests would volunteer to be assigned to a racially 
transitioning parish, saying, “I realize this is an unusual 
request, but these are unusual times.”28 Clearly, leaders of 
Catholic institutions understood the necessity of making 
special efforts to foster stable, integrated neighborhoods 
that would be acceptable to both blacks and whites.
The history of the West End’s St. Rose of Lima Parish, 
established in 1884 and closed in 1992, shows how 
racial demographics affected Catholics in this north city 
neighborhood. The parish flourished in the first half of the 
twentieth century. It shifted from a small rural community 
outside the city limits to serving an increasingly urban 
population, boasting a handsome building dedicated in 
Not all Catholics supported Ritter’s efforts to end segregation 
in parochial schools, as this handbill from 1947 suggests. 
(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)
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1910, a variety of church clubs, and several Catholic 
institutions, including a maternity hospital and a girls’ 
technical school. The parish also ran St. Rose of Lima 
School, with an enrollment of over four hundred students.29 
In recounting the history of St. Rose of Lima from 
1934–1984, the parish history explains: “To tell the story 
of St. Rose Parish… is to tell the story of a neighborhood 
because Catholic parishes are based in neighborhoods. …
[I]n many parishes the people who celebrate the centennial 
are grandchildren of the men and women who celebrated 
the golden jubilee. At St. Rose’s, however, that is not 
the case. There are . . . few such people tied to those 
earlier ones.”30 The history chronicles the racial transition 
of the West End parish. As a small number of black 
Catholics moved into the West End, they experienced a 
moderate degree of discrimination, but the St. Rose of 
Lima Parish history asserts that many white parishioners 
were welcoming. St. Rose School activities were open 
to students regardless of race. One parishioner, Mrs. 
Anson, “took it as her personal ministry to welcome Black 
women and make them part of any activity.”31 The first 
years of integration, both according to the parish history 
as well as St. Rose student Dan Kelley, passed relatively 
uneventfully. Kelley remembers that African American 
students started attending St. Rose Parish elementary 
school without incident in the late forties, saying “they just 
started to show up, and it just wasn’t a big issue.”32 The 
parish history says that racial transition increased sharply 
as federal urban renewal projects demolished hundreds 
of residences in traditionally black neighborhoods. Many 
of these new West End residents rented apartments from 
large, subdivided houses in the neighborhood. St. Rose’s 
Father Clohessy made some efforts to convert blacks, but 
his proselytizing produced few converts. By 1962, only 14 
of St. Rose School’s 450 children were white, and many of 
the new black students were not Catholic.33 
Even though the official history of St. Rose highlights 
the positive aspects of the parish’s racial history, the 
account also reveals white Catholics’ struggles to reconcile 
the church’s call to integrate and personal discomfort 
with racial mixing. Even Father Clohssey demonstrated 
ambivalence in the face of the changing character of the 
parish. The history explains that he was “uncomfortable 
with all the changes” occurring in the parish in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.34 The history repeatedly mentions 
parishioners’ worries about the neighborhood’s racial 
change, heavily implying that an influx of blacks was a 
main reason whites were moving out of the neighborhood. 
Despite the commitment of Catholic institutions and some 
parishioners to integrated neighborhoods and schools, 
in the space of about ten years, the West End’s Catholic 
and non-Catholic population shifted from all-white to 
temporarily integrated to almost exclusively black.
By 1963, St. Rose’s new pastor understood he was 
the leader of a black parish, so in 1964, St. Rose hosted 
a meeting of priests to “study the problems of a Black 
parish.”35 St. Rose Parish, though, could not maintain a 
sustainable number of black parishioners; by 1967, the 
parish only had about two hundred members.36 In 1992, 
St. Rose and five other north city parishes combined due 
to low population. Despite Cardinal Ritter’s commitment 
to integrated education, by the 1960s parishes in the West 
End were focused on maintaining black, not interracial, 
parishes. The history of St. Rose Parish reveals that 
attempts in the fifties to foster an interracial parish as 
well as an integrated neighborhood were ultimately 
unsuccessful. As was typical for St. Louis race relations, 
parishioners limited overt opposition to Cardinal Ritter’s 
desegregation, but their residential patterns simultaneously 
shifted to sustain segregated living patterns. Liberal 
church leaders were unable to use their moral authority 
to overcome parishioners’ deep-seated fears—racial, 
economic, and social—of living among blacks. Because 
most St. Louis Catholics were committed to their faith, 
not to actively pursuing racial equality, church leadership 
could not compel Catholic residents to continue living in 
the area and welcome blacks into their neighborhood.
Jews also migrated out of the city in the decades 
following World War II—and they often did so earlier than 
Catholics—but their reasoning diverged in important ways. 
Unlike Catholic parishes that are geographically bounded, 
synagogues are free to uproot and move in response to 
population shifts. As a result, most Jewish institutions in 
St. Louis actively sought to move locations in anticipation 
of population shifts, and almost every West End Jewish 
congregation moved outside the city limits by the 1960s. 
Some Jews, often affiliated with Jewish organizations, tried 
to maintain their neighborhoods and convince other whites 
to remain. They allied with civil rights organizations and 
created community groups to address the challenges of 
stabilizing neighborhoods undergoing racial transition. 
Despite their efforts, though, these actively liberal Jews 
could not stem the flow of their peers into the county, 
and by about 1960 the neighborhood that had once been 
the center of the St. Louis Jewish community was almost 
exclusively black.
While St. Louis’s Jewish community has always been 
small in comparison with the total population (about 6 
On May 4, 1949, students at Washington University in St. 
Louis held a rally to gain admission for African-Americans 
at the university. (Image: Washington University Special 
Collections)
Spring/Summer 2015 | The Confluence | 53
percent of the city’s population in the early 1900s), Jews 
still profoundly influenced the city and the West End 
neighborhood in particular. Historian Walter Ehrlich 
chronicles St. Louis’s Jewish population in his two-volume 
work, Zion in the Valley. The first documentation of Jews 
in the city dates to the early 1800s, and a handful of Jewish 
institutions arose throughout the mid-1800s. Increased 
Jewish immigration from Europe to St. Louis mirrored 
national immigration patterns of the turn of the twentieth 
century. By 1900, the majority of St. Louis Jews had 
settled in the “Ghetto,” located north of downtown and 
west to Ninth Street. As the population grew, the city’s 
Jewish area expanded west toward Jefferson Avenue.37 
While most Jews were concentrated in this space, the area 
was also home to a variety of working-class newcomers, 
including blacks migrating from the South as well as 
Irish, Italian, and Polish immigrants, many of whom were 
Catholic.38 By the 1920s, the upwardly mobile Jewish 
population had shifted further west from the Mississippi 
River, settling in the West End, and most synagogues 
transferred to new West End locations to better serve 
their congregants. For the next thirty years, the Jewish 
community flourished in the West End. 
A variety of West End institutions served the Jewish 
population. As most Jewish children attended public 
schools, Soldan High School became a source of pride 
for the Jewish community and hosted liberal interfaith 
and interracial events. For example, in 1941 the school 
held a Youth and Democracy Rally, which Catholics, 
Protestants, Jews, blacks, and whites attended.39 While 
Jews were never the majority religion in either the West 
End or at Soldan, the school still offered a full program 
of Jewish classes, as well as an active Hebrew Club.40 
Jewish Soldan graduates of the 1940s discuss their alma 
mater very fondly. Anabelle Chapel remembered, “Soldan 
I really loved. Those were some of the finest days of my 
youth. It was a very good school.”41 Similarly, Harvey 
Brown, who graduated from Soldan in 1944, recalled that 
“Soldan was a great city school.”42 Several alumni who 
graduated in the 1940s particularly remember the school’s 
outstanding English department. From both a social and 
academic perspective, Soldan graduates from the 1940s 
In the 1940s, Soldan High School included a sizable Jewish population integrated into the student body, such as this group 
at the 1949 graduation party. (Image: St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)
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were extremely complimentary of their school. 
In addition to over a dozen houses of worship, the 
Young Men’s/Women’s Hebrew Association (YMHA) 
was another important institution for the West End Jewish 
community. Established in the late 1800s as a men’s 
literary club, the organization expanded in the first half of 
the twentieth century to become one of the most important 
Jewish community institutions in the city. The YMHA 
bounced from location to location in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century. Under the leadership of executive 
director Gilbert Harris, the YMHA purchased land to 
construct a Jewish community center that opened in 1927 
on the corner of Union and Enright, about two blocks 
from Soldan and in the heart of the West End. For three 
decades, this location provided a wide range of services 
to both Jewish and non-Jewish community members. The 
YMHA’s newsletter boasted about expanded facilities and 
opportunities available to members, including a library, 
game room, auditorium, swimming pool, handball courts, 
gym, billiard hall, and roof garden.43 Among various 
athletic teams, social clubs, and educational programs, 
the YMHA’s Liberal Forums stood out as a highlight of 
On May 4, 1949, students at Washington University in St. 
Louis held a rally to gain admission for African-Americans 
at the university. (Image: Washington University Special 
Collections)
A native St. Louisan, Gilbert Harris (seated second from left) 
returned to the city in 1922 to become executive director 
of the YMHA/YWMA in St. Louis after working for the 
National Jewish Welfare Board in New York.  The YMHA/
YWHA building at Union and Enright, built in 1927, was 
among his fundraising accomplishments. (Image: Gilbert 
Harris Collection, St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)
The Young Men’s Hebrew Association (YMHA) was a 
key part of the Jewish cultural life by the 1940s.  The first 
YMHA was founded in Baltimore in 1854 to assist Jewish 
immigrants; a branch opened in St. Louis in 1880.  An 
affiliated arm of it, the Young Women’s Hebrew Association 
(YWHA), was founded in 1888 in New York; the first 
independent YWHA chapter appeared in 1902.  Later 
in the twentieth century, they evolved into today’s Jewish 
Community Center (JCC), offering an array of activities and 
classes, as this catalogue from 1947–1948 suggests.  The 
YMHA/YWHA was at Union and Enright in the West End 
when the cover photo was taken. (Image: St. Louis Jewish 
Community Archives)
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YMHA activities. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the 
Liberal Forum sponsored talks by prominent figures, 
including Eleanor Roosevelt, Clarence Darrow, and Walter 
White.44 YMHA regulars remember Harris’s prominent 
presence at the YMHA. Hans Mayer, who moved to St. 
Louis as a child, explained that Harris was a “highly 
visible” director who always made sure to be present when 
children left for and returned from summer camp.45  
Soldan High School’s experience with school 
desegregation demonstrated the limited extent of what 
the West End’s Jewish and secular passive liberalism 
could achieve. Even though Catholic schools integrated 
in 1947, it was not until the 1954 Brown v. Board decision 
that public schools in St. Louis adopted a desegregation 
plan. Because by this time the city’s Catholic schools had 
desegregated, the passive liberal majority understood the 
inevitability of desegregation and therefore supported 
its implementation. Again, unlike in communities across 
the South, St. Louis’s integration plan was carried out on 
time and with little controversy. Some St. Louis schools, 
especially those in mostly white south city, would not 
experience a significant influx of black students in the 
early years of desegregated education. The heavily Jewish 
Soldan High School, on the other hand, absorbed more 
blacks than any other high school in the city.46 All accounts 
of integration at Soldan in 1955 indicate overwhelming 
success in both planning and implementation. In 
anticipation of the integration, Soldan held a meeting at 
which parents could ask questions and make suggestions 
about easing the transition, and there is no record of 
dissent at this meeting.47 Soldan’s new principal, Stanley 
Hill, connected the process of integration to the reputation 
of the West End, stating that “the good name of the 
neighborhood as well as the city was at stake in avoiding 
incidents such as those in Baltimore and Washington.”48 
To prepare for the new students, transferees met with 
faculty advisors and registered for classes the week before 
integration took place. The first integrated meeting of 
the Soldan-Blewett Parents’ Association had about two 
hundred attendees, many of whom were black.49 
On February 1, 1955, the day St. Louis high schools 
integrated, Soldan absorbed 375 black students, increasing 
the school’s enrollment to 1,350. Speaking three days after 
integration occurred in city high schools, Superintendent 
Hickey announced, “I cannot speak highly enough of the 
manner in which our high school boys and girls of both 
races have accepted this step. . . . [T]he striking thing to 
me is the positive, rather passive, acceptance of the change 
by the student groups.”50 The black press’s evaluation of 
Soldan’s integration was very similar to that of other city 
newspapers, explaining, “observation of passing in the 
corridors and classroom sessions gave no indication that 
anything out of the ordinary had occurred.”51 Soldan’s 
students took pride in the orderly and civilized manner of 
their school’s integration. In both 1955 and 1956, students 
dedicated their yearbook to their school administrators and 
commended the manner in which integration occurred. The 
yearbook editors claimed, “[T]his new administration has 
handled the job of integration with skill and intelligence 
and has made Soldan-Blewett the best integrated school in 
St. Louis.”52 An analysis of yearbook photographs reveals 
that black students participated actively in Soldan’s clubs 
and sports.53
Jake Leventhal and Linda Kraus, two Jewish students 
who attended Soldan when it desegregated, have similar 
memories of the first year of integration. Neither has 
recollections of race-based incidents, and Leventhal called 
the integration process “seamless.” Kraus continued her 
participation in integrated extra-curricular activities, 
including the yearbook, newspaper, and cheerleading, and 
she believed that the integration went as well as it could. 
Neither remembers the school explicitly preparing students 
for the integration, other than assigning students to new 
advisors to make sure that each class had a mix of black 
and white students. As an athlete, Leventhal remembers 
Vice Principal Otto Rost visiting his integrated football 
team during a summer practice and specifically instructing 
the players to “be mixed up” racially the next time he 
came to check on them. Leventhal discussed his time at 
the integrated Soldan fondly, explaining that the school’s 
athletic teams served as a role model for interracial 
cooperation for the entire school.54
Ha Ivria was the Hebrew Cultural Center at Soldan High 
School.  When this picture for the Soldan yearbook 
appeared, Ha Ivria had some 40 members. (Image: St. Louis 
Jewish Community Archives)
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By all accounts the integration had been implemented 
successfully, as evidenced by an almost complete lack of 
controversy, as well as outward community enthusiasm. 
The initial success of Soldan’s integration was due to 
passive liberalism: West End residents understood that 
segregated education was no longer socially acceptable, so 
the community rallied behind a smooth school integration 
in the wake of Brown. The amount of public support given 
to the desegregation process made St. Louisans optimistic 
that their racial liberalism would foster a progressive and 
democratic city. Citizens believed that St. Louis was in 
a prime position to handle interracial urban education 
without violence or controversy, and the confident tone of 
the black press was similar to that of other newspapers. 
In an article published a few days after the high schools’ 
integration, an Argus article asserted, “[T]he cooperation 
of all concerned up to this point is assurance enough 
that St. Louis is foremost among American cities willing 
to advance democracy in deeds.”55 A large and widely 
publicized segment of the city welcomed integrated 
schooling due to liberalism’s commitment to racial 
equality. 
It took only a few years, however, for attentive citizens 
to realize how fleeting this success was, and when faced 
with the reality that integration might require difficult 
personal decisions about where to live and educate 
their children, passive liberals turned their backs on 
integration. In a 1959 statement to the Urban League 
Board of Directors, St. Louis branch executive director 
Leo Bohanon proclaimed, “[A]bout two years ago the first 
complaints alleging a breakdown in school desegregation 
came to the attention of the Urban League. Charges were 
made that the school administration was permitting Clark 
grade and Soldan High schools to become all Negro 
schools in pupils and teachers.” He goes on to state,  
“[T]here is a growing feeling that both the public school 
administration and the Board of Education have adopted 
a laissez faire attitude toward public school integration, 
which borders on indifference” [strikethrough original].56 
He also provided a list of accusations, which included 
busing white students to white schools and overcrowding 
at predominantly black schools. Clearly, the Urban League 
and other civil rights organizations believed passivity and 
indifference were unacceptable.
Further, African American City Alderman William 
Lacy Clay (who would later represent St. Louis in the 
United States House of Representatives) charged that 
“the St. Louis Board of Education and the Department of 
Instruction have been guilty of either a premeditated and 
intentional program to cause and allow the increase of 
segregation in the schools or at the very least have adopted 
policies that have been conducive to the re-segregation of 
the school system.”57 He noted that Soldan was 99 percent 
black, while the neighborhood was 50 percent white; this 
meant that 1,700 white students who should have been 
attending Soldan were being educated in white public 
schools.58 Jake Leventhal explained that one year after he 
graduated from Soldan, his parents moved out of the city 
despite the financial hardship this imposed because his 
sister had been the only white student in her elementary 
school class.59
To understand why and how St. Louis school integration 
failed, it is necessary to analyze conversations surrounding 
residential choices. West End residents, both those merely 
looking for an attractive place to live as well as individuals 
who touted themselves as racially liberal, were ultimately 
unwilling to collectively invest in the continued integration 
and middle-class status of the West End. By analyzing 
housing choices and changes in Jewish institutions’ 
locations, the limits of St. Louis’s passive and active 
liberalism become apparent. Despite the fact that city 
residents were mostly in agreement regarding the need to 
end formal segregation, citizens were largely unwilling to 
sustain this commitment to desegregation through housing 
choices.
While Gilbert Harris was proud of the ways the 
YMHA building on Union Boulevard served the West 
End community, Harris’s goal, like those of the West 
End’s synagogues, was for Jewish institutions to follow 
Ritter issued this statement to support the announced 
desegregation of St. Louis Public Schools in the aftermath 
of the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954.  
Ritter instructed that “This letter to be read at all Masses on 
Sunday, June 27, 1954.” (Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis 
Archives)
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Jewish population trends, not to shape them. The YMHA’s 
commitment to following Jewish population patterns led 
to complex and contradictory statements and policies 
regarding Jews’ residential choices and their role in 
fostering integrated neighborhoods. As it became apparent 
by the late forties that Jews were increasingly choosing 
to live west of the city limits, by 1950 Harris advocated 
heavily for the YMHA to move out of the city, despite the 
fact that a significant number of Jews remained in the West 
End into the mid-1950s. Therefore, Jewish institutions’ 
movement out of the city cannot simply be attributed 
to attractions of suburban living; predictions of future 
population trends were based on racialized assumptions 
that upwardly mobile Jews would not live among blacks.
A 1947 YMHA program needs survey provides insight 
into both the state of the West End neighborhood and the 
Jewish community’s future in it, and its recommendations 
reveal deep problems with passive liberalism. In 1947, 
the survey stated, about one-half of St. Louis’s Jewish 
population resided outside city limits, with a high 
concentration in University City, a municipality directly 
bordering the West End. With this information, the authors 
believed that the city’s Jewish population would soon be 
concentrated west of the city limits. Taking this impending 
population shift into account, the report predicted that the 
Union Boulevard YMHA building would only continue 
to be an adequate location for another ten to fifteen years, 
as long as satellite programs were created to reach Jews 
outside the city. 
While this report provided a large amount of 
demographic information about the region’s Jewish 
population, its references to neighboring black populations 
provide a fascinating window into Jews’ feelings about 
the possibility of integrated neighborhoods. Published 
before the Shelley v. Kraemer decision, this report 
indicates that Jewish institutional leaders assumed blacks 
would eventually move into the West End. Even before 
the demise of racially restrictive housing covenants, the 
report correctly predicted that blacks would soon reside 
in areas of the West End that were primarily comprised 
of rental properties. Though the report does not explicitly 
label this impending trend as negative, the writers were 
uneasy about the effects blacks would have in the West 
End. The fact that blacks were the only non-Jewish group 
referenced in the report indicates that the authors drew 
a direct connection between migration of blacks into 
the West End and the neighborhood’s decline in Jewish 
population. This connection was a thinly veiled admission 
that, regardless of widespread support for the ideal of 
integration, the authors assumed most Jews did not want 
to live in a racially integrated neighborhood. The report 
stated that when blacks began to move into the West 
End, “Union Avenue from Delmar to Page will probably 
remain a [Jewish] civic center area for a period of about 15 
years.”60 The report had racial overtones without making 
any explicit race-based recommendations. When blacks, 
as predicted, did begin migrating into the West End, the 
YMHA’s, as well as the Jewish community’s, responses 
were simultaneously welcoming and wary. Some Jews 
actively welcomed the transitioning neighborhood’s 
interracial character, and the YMHA provided a number of 
interracial programs, indicating the institution’s acceptance 
of blacks in the neighborhood. However, even as Jews 
accepted the concept of integration, most did not believe 
it was their personal responsibility to foster integration 
through housing choices.
YMHA Executive Director Gilbert Harris’s statements 
regarding neighborhood racial transition were dizzyingly 
contradictory, and these inconsistencies demonstrated the 
genuine ambivalence he and many other passively liberal 
residents likely felt regarding how to interpret changes in 
the West End and Jewish institutions’ role in shaping those 
changes. “Our Neighborhood,” a speech Harris delivered 
seven years after the program needs survey recommended 
moving the YMHA to the suburbs, clearly illustrated his 
confusion. In one section of the speech, he stated:
The [West End] which once was an area of home 
owners . . . is now characterized as a neighborhood 
of transients and lower economic groups. I make this 
statement objectively and without any lament for 
the good old days. Every American city and every 
American neighborhood seems to go through its 
years of youth, maturity and decline. . . . Today there 
are some communities that are concerned with the 
conservation process of neighborhoods and are doing 
something about it, and hopefully in the future more 
neighborhoods will continue to be zealous to maintain 
their character. In giving these facts I do not speak 
disparagingly of any people. All peoples need housing 
and we know that as their economic status improves, 
their social acceptability advances too.61
Several key paradoxes were present in Harris’s thinking, 
and these complexities reveal the limitations of passive 
liberals’ thought and action on race issues. First, Harris 
simultaneously identified with the West End but also 
showed willingness to abandon the neighborhood for the 
sake of economic opportunity in the suburbs. Second, he 
provided only lukewarm evaluations of efforts to conserve 
the character of transitioning neighborhoods, despite the 
fact that the YMHA sometimes served as a meeting place 
for the religious and secular organizations that championed 
integration. Third, he portrayed neighborhood change as 
inevitable, again, despite the fact that the YMHA hosted 
organizations firmly committed to halting neighborhood 
deterioration through maintenance of integration. Harris 
seemed in favor of neighborhood conservation efforts 
in theory, but as a Jewish community leader, he was 
unwilling to participate in them actively or to make the 
YMHA building a symbol of Jewish commitment to West 
End neighborhood integration.
Later in this same speech, he made the following 
comments:
Those of us who live in our neighborhood like it 
and want to improve it in whatever way we can. 
Unfortunately, there are not enough people who are 
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energetic enough to do the job. . . . They were full of 
venom about having to leave the neighborhood and to 
suffer financial losses in selling their homes, and were 
very cynical about the newcomers. … As one who has 
lived most of his life in the general neighborhood, and 
who looks forward to many more years there, I am 
anxious to see the neighborhood maintain itself. It has 
many advantages—cultural, spiritual, and geographic. 
I know there are those who share the same point 
of view and with their help we hope that our 
neighborhood will continue to be a fine and interesting 
place in which to live.62
Here again, Harris’ contradictions were glaring. He 
concurrently assumed that whites would abandon the 
neighborhood, expressed whites’ anger at the declining 
status of the neighborhood, and also stated that he intended 
to continue living in the West End. The very belief that 
property values would fall simply due to blacks’ presence 
in a neighborhood shows whites’ racial fears. Because the 
fear of declined economic status was tied to integrated 
neighborhoods, financial interest easily trumped passive 
liberal ideology. While it is unclear whether Harris was 
conscious of all these contradictions, their presence in a 
public speech indicated that Harris himself wrestled with 
his understanding of changes in the West End. There were 
certainly racist qualities to his statements, yet his ideas do 
not seem hateful. Rather, he was demonstrating a genuine 
attempt to process the rapid societal changes occurring 
around him, attempts that West End residents were likely 
also grappling with.
In a speech a few months later, Harris made 
a fascinating comment about the importance of 
neighborhood institutions, saying, “institutions uphold 
property values. Would Union Boulevard have remained 
the street it is today, with the various institutions 
located in that area, or would it have held up better with 
residences?”63 He attributed the West End’s success to 
the existence of institutions (religious as well as secular), 
yet he advocated for pulling the YMHA out of the West 
End for the sake of Jewish progress in the suburbs.64 The 
decision to move the YMHA into West County mirrored 
the decisions of synagogues. Congregation B’Nai 
Amoona, for example, began searching for a new location 
almost immediately after purchasing a property in the 
West End.65 For Harris, like most liberal Jews, opportunity 
for economic upward mobility in the suburbs or fears of 
declining financially trumped opportunities to maintain 
the status of a cherished neighborhood. If Gilbert Harris 
was an accurate representation of liberal Jews’ conflicted 
feelings on integration and neighborhood change, it is no 
surprise that efforts to maintain neighborhood integration 
failed miserably. Liberal individuals were unable to see the 
racist assumptions underlying the belief that integration 
would necessarily lead to decreased property values, so 
St. Louisans’ liberal ideology could not be a vehicle for 
realizing integration in the West End.
Even though some St. Louis Jewish leaders were in 
the vanguard of advocating for integrated schools and 
neighborhoods, their active liberalism could not convince 
passively liberal counterparts to remain in an integrating 
community. These actively liberal Jews, like counterparts 
in other cities, believed their decisions on where to live 
and educate their children could play a role in creating 
stable, desirable, and integrated urban neighborhoods. To 
achieve a desirable integrated neighborhood, community 
activists would have to work against ambivalence 
regarding individuals’ personal roles in maintaining the 
integrated, middle-class character of the West End. It 
would only be possible to sustain integration through 
explicit claims that the West End could maintain its 
desirable character, convincing white residents they should 
not sell their properties.
During the brief time that St. Louis’s public school 
desegregation generally and Soldan’s integration 
specifically seemed to be working as planned, religious 
and secular organizations committed themselves to making 
the West End a model of a successful, integrated, and 
stable middle-class neighborhood. The Jewish Community 
Relations Council (JCRC) was in the vanguard of 
these efforts. Through the leadership of St. Louis 
branch Executive Director Myron Schwartz, the JCRC 
provided active leadership in a variety of neighborhood 
improvement efforts and collaborated frequently with 
the Urban League as well as various neighborhood-
based organizations. Schwartz corresponded frequently 
with other cities’ JCRC leaders to understand how other 
city neighborhoods were dealing with neighborhood 
racial transition. JCRC leaders across the urban North 
understood neighborhood change as a democratic issue. 
A draft of a JCRC guide for changing neighborhoods 
explained, “[T]he contradictions between our democratic 
principles and our actual practices cannot help but arouse 
suspicion, cynicism and distrust, both among our own 
citizens and our watchful allies.”66 Clearly, a cohort of 
Jewish leaders understood that vocalizing integrationist 
rhetoric amidst a mass exodus into the suburbs would 
not promote racial equality. Maintaining integrated 
neighborhoods would require active decisions by Jews 
to remain rooted in urban neighborhoods in the face of 
speculation and panic.
However, as historian Lila Berman has indicated 
and the St. Louis experience demonstrated, most urban 
Jews were unwilling to base housing decisions on the 
possibility of maintaining integration. Even the national 
JCRC report’s recommendations did not include calls to 
sustain residences in transitioning neighborhoods; instead, 
it suggested what Berman termed “remote urbanism”: 
population studies, education, and political activism to 
increase access to non-discriminatory housing, allowing 
Jews to devote charitable funds to urban areas while 
simultaneously moving out of them.67 Remote urbanism, 
though, was an acceptance of passive liberalism, because it 
allowed people to believe they could support urban issues 
while concurrently disinvesting in cities by moving to the 
suburbs. The JCRC report therefore fell into the trap it 
cautioned leaders to avoid: the report wanted to support 
urban neighborhoods through rhetoric and charity, but it 
Spring/Summer 2015 | The Confluence | 59
did not call for Jews to make their housing choices based 
on an ideal of integrated communities. Most passive liberal 
Jews believed they could further racial equality verbally 
and politically while making personal choices to move into 
racially homogenous suburbs. Myron Schwartz, the St. 
Louis JCRC branch, and other neighborhood organizations 
attempted a more active role in maintaining integrated 
living space through alliances with local organizations, 
but these efforts proved unsustainable because most white 
West End residents were unwilling to let a desire for 
neighborhood integration dictate personal choices of where 
to live. Therefore, many attempts to be actively liberal 
quickly became passive, as Jewish organizations were 
largely unwilling to ask Jews to make housing choices 
based on a commitment to racial equality. 
Starting in 1953, two interracial and actively liberal 
West End organizations, first the Union Boulevard 
Association (UBA) and later the West End Community 
Conference (WECC), attempted to craft a stable, middle-
class, desirable, and integrated neighborhood. Their efforts 
and shortcomings demonstrate difficulties active liberals 
confronted in the face of a passively liberal majority. That 
year, the UBA conducted a small survey of thirty-seven 
West End residents to understand how people perceived 
changes within the neighborhood. Many white respondents 
believed that they lived in an ideal location, but they also 
cited racially coded reasons for wanting to move out, 
including “crowding, dirt, [and] noise,” as well as some 
explicit discomfort with proximity to blacks.68
The most creative UBA campaign involved decreasing 
blight in the blocks surrounding Soldan High School. 
To stabilize areas of the neighborhood that were 
deteriorating and maintain property values, a group of 
residents requested urban renewal funding from the 
city government to study zoning violations and build 
parks and playgrounds. The press lauded these efforts, 
claiming, “Residents of the Soldan-Blewett High School 
neighborhood set a fine example with their proposal 
to organize a conservation and improvement program 
before it is too late. . . . Here is planning at its best—city 
planning with a strong base of neighborhood interest and 
initiative.”69 In order to receive federal funding, West End 
residents had to request that areas of their neighborhood 
be labeled “blighted,” so that they would be eligible for 
urban renewal money. Though federal urban renewal 
programs—both nationally and in St. Louis—were largely 
vilified by the mid-1960s because they were often used 
to fund entrepreneurs’ interests over those of residents, 
this instance of West End community members requesting 
funding shows that in urban renewal’s early stages, St. 
Louis residents were sometimes able to have an impact on 
where and how federal funding was spent. Despite these 
innovative, citizen-led efforts, the UBA had little lasting 
impact on the West End. In fact, labeling sections of the 
West End as blighted may have backfired because many 
residents likely felt uneasy about living in spaces marked 
as deteriorating. The UBA’s experimentation showed that 
some West End residents were willing to work creatively 
to maintain the status of their neighborhood.
While the UBA clearly wanted to improve the 
neighborhood, it was the West End Community 
Conference that more directly attempted to stave off white 
flight. Formed in 1955, the WECC’s explicit goal was to 
keep the West End a high quality, integrated neighborhood. 
A flier advertising an April 1955 meeting explained,  
“[M]any of us feel that this is a good neighborhood to live 
in and want to see it preserved and improved. That’s why 
over a hundred of us met recently to found . . . The West 
End Community Conference.”70 By 1957, the WECC, 
which served a 150-block area that was home to 25,000 
residents, boasted 800 members. A 1957 St. Louis Post-
Dispatch article detailing WECC work explained that the 
its strategy for maintaining integration revolved around 
stabilizing real estate prices by maintaining physical 
neighborhood space and convincing residents to remain in 
the neighborhood. The article attributed WECC successes 
to the presence of liberal residents, claiming that “a vital 
factor . . . was the presence in the area of an extraordinary 
number of people of broadly liberal bent, accustomed 
to leadership, unafraid of responsibility and fully aware 
of how much might depend on the example they set.”71 
West End resident Mrs. Carl Meyers typified this liberal 
commitment to remaining in the neighborhood. She 
explained, “[W]e deliberately chose to live here . . . we 
like it simply because it isn’t homogeneous. In our block 
there is a professor at Washington University, another 
man rich enough to have a chauffeur, and a laborer. 
We’re interested in people, and in finding the answer to 
the question: Can people really change things, or does 
nature take its course?”72 Clearly, a vocal, though probably 
small, group of actively liberal residents was willing to 
base their housing choices on maintaining an integrated 
neighborhood.
The WECC enjoyed a positive reputation for its first 
five years of existence. In reference to the WECC, a black 
newspaper article stated, “[H]ere is a particular section 
of a great city that has been justly held up as an example 
of what can be done under our American democracy.”73 
However, this idealistic view of the neighborhood was 
incredibly tenuous, and a scandal within WECC leadership 
illustrated the fragility of white racial liberalism in St. 
Louis. In 1960, the WECC suddenly lost its positive 
reputation as a liberal interracial organization due to an 
incident involving a board member. Landlord and WECC 
Vice-Chairman William Baggerman evicted a husband 
and wife from his building upon learning that they were 
an interracial couple. Baggerman claimed he evicted the 
couple because they had “acted in bad faith by concealing 
the fact of [the] wife’s race, [while] Negro members of the 
WECC said Baggerman’s actions were motivated by racial 
prejudice.”74 This incident exposed serious latent tensions 
within the organization and undermined the interracial 
harmony on which the WECC was predicated. In response 
to this controversy, the WECC board voted on whether 
to “pass judgment on William Baggerman’s behavior,” 
and it was the first time in WECC history that a vote was 
split down racial lines.75 Only one black woman voted 
with the conference’s white members, stating she wanted 
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to keep lines of communication open, while a single 
white member, a Washington University dean, voted with 
the conference’s African American leaders to condemn 
Baggerman’s actions.
WECC members’ reactions to this controversy reveal 
how quickly active liberal viewpoints cracked under 
pressure. One frustrated white member exclaimed,  
“[W]hy do you always want to rush things. You are trying 
to go too fast. If you would just slow down maybe we 
would work something out”; a black member responded, 
“[W]e are not that kind of organization. This should never 
have come up.”76 This interchange demonstrates a glaring 
miscommunication between white and black WECC 
members. White members embraced liberal race relations 
when they provided a noncontroversial way to deal with 
inevitable school and neighborhood integration that did not 
require personal or economic sacrifice. When tested by a 
controversy, though, white liberals retreated to passivity, 
preferring not to “rush things.” This dialogue shows that 
above all, white liberals in the West End, whether passive 
or active, wanted to avoid upheaval. Here lies the ultimate 
problem with liberalism in St. Louis: even if a number 
of actively liberal individuals were willing to make their 
housing choices based on a desire to foster an integrated 
neighborhood, they could not accept that the process of 
maintaining integration would sometimes be contentious 
and uncomfortable. If the most actively liberal white 
community members were asking blacks to “just slow 
down,” it is no wonder that integration efforts quickly 
faltered. 
Media response to this incident was strong, indicating 
how much stock community members had placed in the 
WECC, and they quickly highlighted the limits of white 
West Enders’ liberalism. One article explained that the 
incident may be “the real test of whether the West End 
Community Conference is a genuine democratic outgrowth 
in our American way, or is only a façade for pretentious 
half-believers.”77 The Argus, St. Louis’s black newspaper, 
echoed these questions of whites’ sincerity, stating that 
“the majority of the whites, we are sure, felt snug and 
secure in the feeling that ‘we are among the enlightened 
liberals of this day.’”78 To both black and white residents, 
this incident revealed the tenuous nature of interracial 
alliances in the West End, as well as the inability of 
liberalism to maintain commitments to integration amidst a 
contentious atmosphere. 
Although the controversy did not cause the WECC to 
disband, it was a crippling blow—a number of frustrated 
members (mostly black) resigned, and records of WECC 
activities after the scandal are infrequent. It is crucial to 
note how quick newspapers were to highlight whites’ 
wavering commitment to full integration and liberalism, 
in contrast to the notable lack of controversy in accounts 
of the 1955 public school desegregation. By 1960, then, 
both blacks and whites were skeptical of white liberal 
commitments to racial equality. If the WECC could be 
debilitated by one controversy, it is unsurprising that 
efforts to maintain the interracial demographics of the 
neighborhood failed. Because racial liberalism could 
so quickly unravel, it was only natural that West End 
residents who were not politically active would be 
unwilling to maintain integration through housing choices 
that came with economic and social status risks. The 
WECC controversy exemplified the fragility of St. Louis’s 
liberal commitment to an interracial society.
The West End’s current segregation and decreased 
economic status was largely due to the weaknesses of 
American liberalism. In St. Louis, as well as throughout 
the country, liberals were unable to sustain combining 
the ideals of racial equality and middle-class economic 
opportunity, and fleeting attempts to do so floundered 
at the first signs of interracial contention. The methods 
of the West End Community Conference demonstrated 
that active liberals knew how to simultaneously promote 
integration and middle class neighborhood status. 
However, the organization’s history showed West Enders’ 
inability to fully commit to these methods, because passive 
liberalism allowed people to espouse racially progressive 
rhetoric while making housing decisions based on racial 
fears. Fleeting successes like the smooth school integration 
could not convince white liberals that it was worth 
working through racial tension to create an integrated 
and economically upwardly mobile urban neighborhood. 
Instead, liberals used the excuse of pursuing economic 
opportunity to abandon commitments to racial equality 
and integration. Ultimately, white liberals in St. Louis 
believed that a future of integrated neighborhoods, while a 
commendable ideal, was not the best avenue to pursue the 
economic and social status they desired.
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